Revisiting the Scope-based Argument against Relational Egalitarianism

The question concerning the specific contribution of relational egalitarianism to a general theory of global justice remains largely unexplored, as relational egalitarian theorists have mostly focussed on spelling out the core ideal’s requirements for the domestic, political society. In this paper, I discuss one reason for explaining this research lacuna, the influential so-called scope-based argument that has been levelled against relational egalitarian theories of justice. This argument holds that, since its conception of equality stresses the existence of a specific kind of normatively significant relations as a necessary condition for its requirements to apply, the apparent lack of such relations across and beyond states’ borders positions relational egalitarians directly and exclusively within the camp of statist theories about global justice. Thus, it suggests that the value of relational equality is mostly exhausted by requirements of social justice. In contrast, I argue in this paper that the scope-based argument ought to be rejected since it misconstrues our fundamental reasons for valuing relational equality: the normative features which ground demands for egalitarian relations are not uniquely instantiated in domestic relations of democratic reciprocity, social cooperation, or coercive institutions. By tackling the premises that serve to establish the statist conclusion, I claim that a global scope represents the best interpretation of the foundation of the relational egalitarian ideal. On the basis of that, I eventually aim to demonstrate the content and value of relational equality in accounting for globalised social and economic relations, as an example for the specific contribution that relational egalitarianism has for contemporary theorising about global justice.