(Forced) migration as a critical case study: What do we mean by ‘context’ in context-dependent analyses?

Whether a normative political theory is sufficiently ‘fact-sensitive ⁄ realistic’ or not depends on its intended aim and question. This suggests that the ‘debate’ between more-or-less realistic theories is somewhat misconstrued. Realists and Rawlsian liberals are not in disagreement about how to answer the same question. Rather, they seem to be more aptly seen as answering different questions. When it comes to the ethics of immigration, perhaps Joseph Carens (1996) is right to suggest that the correct level of idealization, and the related distance between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’, should depend on the particular aims of one’s theorizing. Excluding altogether absurd moral demands, which would involve breaking the laws of physics, or ignoring the deepest features of human psychology, we may legitimately vary the factual input informing normative political theories. If we want a yardstick for measuring how much our society is failing compared to a fully ideal one, then we need to make minimal factual assumptions, such as moderate scarcity, limited altruism, and perhaps reasonable disagreement. That is, we must not include unjust human conduct. If, on the other hand, we wish to design prescriptions that are likely to be effective, given some common flaws in human behaviour, then we better factor in more real-world constraints. To be sure, if we take this view, political theories can be seen as more or less realistic along a continuum, with no categorical difference between them (cf. Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012). However, since the relevant facts will vary on a case-by-case basis, it is almost impossible to come up with a general rule prescribing what the correct level of idealization in normative theorizing should be. In this paper, I reflect on why we should refine our understanding of context(s) itself, while justifying norms and principles. Initially, I briefly sketch what I describe as a ‘contextual (non-)compliance’ analysis – i.e., an analysis that requires us refining the moral reasons we offer in the light of some contrasting political realities. To substantiate my argument, I illustrate some migration related issues from both the Global North and the Global South, thereby shedding light on state’s contrasting moral-political motivations to host / exclude displaced persons. Then, I argue that political theory must be sensitive to the many varying institutions existing in the international terrain of politics, before formulating – if it is feasible - norms and principles to be globally applied. Finally, the fruitfulness of this approach is that it can take the political question seriously without being uncritical of actual politics and power, and that it can be normative without being moralistic.