How Political Power and Capital Captures a Regulatory Authority: Turkey’s Radio and Television Supreme Council

Independent regulatory authorities are expected to act as depoliticized agents to prevent market failures in the sector they regulate. However, as the political signal theory reveals, it has been observed that while fulfilling this function, the regulatory authorities cannot escape from the interventions and control of the political power. In addition, capture theory scholars claim that regulation is designed and operated for the benefit of the dominant capital groups in the sector. This article aims to discuss both approaches in the case of the Turkish radio and TV sector. Following the liberalization of the sector in 1994, the Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council was established as a regulatory body to control market entry and exit, protect competition and determine broadcasting service standards. Our findings support the idea that the close relations between capital groups and the important political figures, which is clearly known from the very beginning of the liberalization of the sector, facilitate these groups to gain a privileged position in the media sector. On the basis of the data gathered, document analysis, and interviews, we claim that the Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council has been captured by both political power and the dominant capitalist groups in the sector by losing its administrative and financial autonomy.