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Italians do it worse. Anticorruption policies between irrelevance and politicisation

Governance
Media
Political Parties
Social Movements
Corruption
Judicialisation
Mobilisation
Alberto Vannucci
Università di Pisa
Alberto Vannucci
Università di Pisa

Abstract

Anticorruption is a non-positional issue, meaning that all political actors should exhibit the same preference for “less corruption”. Therefore, the characteristics of its politicisation as an issue has an impact on the potential adoption and effectiveness of anticorruption policies. Politicisation is a multidimensional concept, however. Three distinct dimensions will be taken into consideration: salience of corruption/anticorruption issue, i.e. its public resonance; expansion of political actors involved; the intensity of their commitment. A typology will highlight in general terms four models of politicisation of corruption issue. Focusing on the Italian case, the concept of politicisation will be operationalized with indicators and indexes showing its relevance in the media system, in political parties’ electoral manifestos, in collective mobilisation. The following hypotheses will be tested: (i) politicisation of corruption seems to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for the adoption and anticorruption measures. (ii) In phases of high politicisation, a dual confrontation emerges between different parties and between the political class and civil society. Consequently, it becomes possible the adoption of anticorruption measures aimed at re-legitimizing existing political actors with large parliamentary majorities, having a strong correlation with electoral choices and political turnover. (iii) When politicisation involves an intense confrontation, but limited to a smaller set of “elite” political actors, the eventual adoption of anti-corruption measures can be supported by smaller majorities, with a limited correlation with electoral choices and parliamentary turnover. The interaction between politicisation and some contextual factors will also be taken into consideration.