Higher asymmetry, better outcome? Reading Niger-EU and Tunisia-EU relations through a PCR lens

The paper investigates whether highly asymmetrical PC relations can improve the client’s position more than less asymmetric relations. In order to do so, I analyse Tunisia and Niger’s bargaining strategies vis-à-vis the EU over the past decade (2011-2021). The puzzle is that, notwithstanding the higher degree of asymmetry in the Niger-EU than the Tunisia-EU relationship, Niamey has managed to better capitalise than Tunis on EU’s main foreign policy concerns — i.e., migration and security in the neighbourhood. Following Scott, both relations are based on all the fundamental features characterising PCR, that is asymmetry, reciprocity, and affectivity. The asymmetrical component of the relations is evident in most domains, yet above all in military and economic terms. Since 2011 both countries have undergone major political changes, though for different reasons. After seven coups d’état Niger, one of the poorest country in the world, established a democracy that in 2021 realised the first peaceful alternation of power and os now building the largest army of the Sahel. This occurred in the midst of a persisting security and economic crisis, with the neighbouring Mali and Libya ravaged by a decade of war, and the rentable migrant transport sector outlawed in 2016 due to EU pressure. Following the Jasmine Revolution in 2011, Tunisia represented the model of a successful democratic transition only to fall back in recent years to dire economic conditions and the authoritarian regime of Kaïs Saïed. Being one of the major transit states to Europe and having been hit by jihadist attacks in 2015, the country had become a major concern for EU’s security and migration policies. At the same time, migration and security have become top priorities in the EU foreign policy architecture. In PC terms, the increased importance that the patron has attached to two fundamental assets possessed by the client (migration and security) could potentially improve the latter’s position. The exchange schema between the parties is highly unequal and difficult to compare, consisting in the delivery of funds and advantages by Brussels in exchange for Tunis and Niamey’s compliance with EU priorities — which points to reciprocity. Both relations are thus based on bargaining, that is the process by which the exchange takes place. Studying negotiations in a comparative way seems the most suitable way to understand the evolution of power relations and asymmetry between the parties, and thus to understand if and how higher degrees of asymmetry can favour the client. To examine Niger and Tunisia’s bargaining strategies and evaluate their success, I investigate the related tactics and narratives. Tactics (e.g., concessions and issue-linkage) are essential to discern how a specific bargaining outcome came about. Narratives, instead, are fundamental tools thanks to which a party is able to influence the other party’s perception of its own power and, in turn, to influence its moves and strategy. Narratives are also strongly intertwined with the affective component of these relations, since they are often based either on accusations of postcolonialism or the emphasis on a friendly partnership.