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The Polish model of the distribution of foreign policy competencies between the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers and its modifications in times of emergencies

Europe (Central and Eastern)
Foreign Policy
Government
Monika Florczak-Wątor
Jagiellonian University
Monika Florczak-Wątor
Jagiellonian University

Abstract

The paper will aim to present a model of the distribution of foreign policy competencies between the two organs of executive power in Poland, i.e., the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers. The analysis will consider the provisions of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the practice of their application, and the relevant case law of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The division of powers between the President and the government in foreign policy has been the subject of lively disputes for many years due to the vagueness of the constitutional regulation. On the one hand, Article 126(1) of the Constitution indicates that the President of the Republic is “the supreme representative of the Republic of Poland,” while, on the other hand, Article 146 of the Constitution states that it is the Council of Ministers that “conducts (...) the foreign policy of the Republic of Poland” and “exercises general leadership in the field of relations with other states and international organizations.” Moreover, Article 133(3) of the Constitution obligates the President of the Republic to cooperate with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the field of foreign policy without explicitly imposing a corresponding obligation on the government to cooperate with the head of state in this area. However, cooperation between these bodies is inevitable due to the need for the President to obtain the countersignature of the Prime Minister under any official act concerning foreign policy. This complicated model of the distribution of foreign policy competencies between the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers was partially clarified by the Constitutional Tribunal in its decision of May 20, 2009, Kpt 2/08, which will also be analysed. In addition, modifications to this model, which the Constitution provides for due to the introduction of a state of emergency in Poland, will be presented.