The distribution of executive power and corruption: A meta-analysis

Over three decades of corruption research have investigated the effect of democratic institutions on corruption, however, to this point the debates on horizontal and vertical divisions of power have not produced conclusive results nor coherent theories on which constitutional arrangements are most conducive to lower corruption. In this article, we seek to investigate the relationship between constitutional arrangements through a meta-analysis, making use of the rich literature on these issues. Further, we investigate which factors moderate the reported relationship between institutions and corruption. Our findings illustrate the considerable heterogeneity in previous findings across the dimensions, but also suggest that model specifications and underlying samples can explain the heterogeneity in previous findings. In the case of federalism, our results indicate that heterogeneity in effects can be attributed to the difference between the concepts of political and fiscal decentralization. We find that on average, parliamentary systems and fiscal decentralization are more often associated with lower corruption, and heterogeneity in effects can be attributed to the inclusion of other constitutional features in the model, such as the electoral system and to the underlying sample. However, the overall effect of political decentralization is close to null and we are unable to explain the heterogeneity of effects for this factor.