Taking disdain seriously: An emotional perspective on political compromise

In this paper, I seek to understand the role of emotions in normative objections to compromise. In particular, I focus on the anti-relativist objections to compromise identified by Baume and Papadopoulos (2022). To derive the emotional component underlying this particular objection to political compromise, I examine a theoretical corpus of authors who raise anti-relativist objections to political compromise, namely, Hallowell (1944) and Weisberg (2014). My analysis builds on empirical research on the relationship between emotions and normative judgments (Bandes et al., 2012; Goodenough & Tucker 2010; Goodwin et al. 2001). Empirical evidence overwhelmingly shows that moral judgments are influenced by emotions (Greene, 2013, 2014; Haidt, 2001, 2012; Helion & Pizarro, 2015; Prinz 2007). In this paper, I focus specifically on moral emotions: I assume that these are the factors most frequently mobilized - often strategically - by proponents of the anti-relativist objection to compromise. Therefore, I hypothesize that in order to understand the persistence and robustness of the anti-relativist objection to political compromise, we must also consider the underlying moral emotions, as they appear in discourses denouncing the risks of compromise, especially when it is made at the expense of fundamental values. Furthermore, I argue that these moral emotions are often rooted in narratives that glorify flexiphobia. In doing so, I hope to contribute to a better understanding of the tenacity that so often characterises anti-relativist objections to compromise.