Institutionalizing Mutual Tolerance? Legislative Opposition Power and the Decline of Democracy

Around the globe, democracies have come under pressure. Hence, it is no surprise that scholarly work has increasingly addressed explanations of democratic decline and breakdown as well as focused on conditions that contribute to more democratic stability. Research on which democratic designs lead to more stable democracies are among the most traditional and well known areas in political science. However, one inherent part of democracies has not received a lot of attention: the opposition. Although research has shown a wide range of power granted to oppositions, little research exists investigating the consequences of these institutional differences. In this paper, I investigate the relationship between institutionalized opposition power in legislative chambers and the decline of democracy. Results point to the importance of institutionalizing legislative opposition power. Even if weak opposition power does not exclude democratic stability, instances of democratic decline are strongly linked to weak institutionalization of legislative opposition power. These results have important implications for future research on questions relating to the role of legislatures more generally for democratic stability and backsliding.