The Consequences of Proscribing Political Parties in Latin America since 1990

Banning political parties is an extreme measure that many democracies tend to use sparingly. Nevertheless, Latin American countries have banned hundreds of parties since 1990. The Latin American practice differs immensely from the European one where parties are banned as protection against anti-democratic, terrorist and extremist forces. Conversely, the most common legal provision to proscribe parties in Latin America is not reaching certain set share of votes or seats in an election. These so-called dissolution thresholds are demanding in some countries, reaching up to 5 percent of cast votes. Which parties and for what reason have been proscribed in Latin America since 1990? The first part of the presentation will focus on the identity of banned parties and the evolution of party banning legal provisions (in constitutions and party and election laws) in all Latin American countries. The second part will evaluate the political effect of dissolution thresholds empirically. These rules are expected to stabilize and simplify party systems. However, a competing theory suggests that such rules instead promote electoral volatility by injecting political uncertainty into the party system, due to cyclical re-foundation of extinct parties as well as due to the mechanical effects of parties’ exits. Attempting to resolve this paradox, I test the effect of dissolution thresholds on electoral volatility in all Latin American democratic elections since 1980. Party bans based on dissolution thresholds are found to promote electoral volatility which bears implications for democratic governance.