Bureaucratic activism in times of democratic backsliding: when do unions and peers’ support matter?

In settings of political attacks on the rule of law and on public administration, why do bureaucrats take the risk of implementing actions to defend institutions that oppose the agenda of illiberal politicians? This study aims to identify and characterize the determinants that shape bureaucratic reactions to politicians’ threats in contexts of democratic backsliding. Precisely, this paper addresses the question: which factors influence the bureaucratic reactions to illiberal politicians, in contexts of democratic backsliding? With the rise of democratic backsliding processes in contemporary democracies, recent studies have investigated the relationship between politicians’ actions and bureaucrats’ responses to them. Theory predicts that when faced with political threats imposed by an authoritarian political leader, bureaucrats can behave in different ways: they can be loyal to elected politicians; avoid the risk of political confrontation using actions such as exit or shirking; or engage in sabotage practices or oppose politicians through the use of policy instruments and formal mechanisms. Although recent studies have addressed how authoritarian political leaders try to control the bureaucracies, and how bureaucrats react to these actions, there is scant empirical research on the drivers (or determinants) of bureaucratic response in times of democratic backsliding. This study aims to identify and characterize the determinants that shape bureaucratic reactions to politicians’ threats, especially at the organizational level. Through both interviews and an online survey experiment relying on randomized vignettes, we test whether different types of organizational support affect bureaucrats’ behavior and resilience in the face of populist challenges. We rely on data gathered from 609 bureaucrats working at the Brazilian federal government in public agencies in the environmental and indigenous policy sector, under former president Jair Bolsonaro’s government. Bureaucrats were provided with hypothetical scenarios and were asked to what extent they would engage in activist practices in a situation where politicians threatened their bureaucratic autonomy. The preliminary findings indicate that collective incentives matter for bureaucrats to be able to react and defend their agencies’ institutional mission when facing threats from illiberal politicians. Specifically, the results suggest that the type of collective incentive determines the type of bureaucrats' reaction strategy: (i) informal incentives, such as peers’ support, have a positive impact on bureaucratic reaction through informal practices (e.g., sabotage practices). (ii) Formal incentives, such as unions’ support, have a positive impact on bureaucratic reaction through formal practices (e.g., practices of formally issuing and registering technical advice, even in contexts of misalignment between the agency’s institutional mission and the political agenda of authoritarian leaders). The findings show that, when provided with additional support and incentives from their peers or unions, bureaucrats are more likely to engage in activist practices aimed at protecting their agencies’ institutional goal even in the face of populist challenges. These findings contribute to the literature by assessing the causal effects of organizational factors on bureaucrats' behavior in reaction to threats imposed by illiberal politicians, based on an experimental research design.