Two visions of liberal international order

There has been an ongoing discourse on the ontology and epistemology of the liberal international order. Academics, politicians, journalists, and the public discourse all often speak about the rules-based order implicit of the so-called liberal international order (LIO). However, this term has created confusion in the international relations (IR) discipline, partly due to its slippery concept and in part rendered by its diverse dimensions. IR scholars disagree on many issues – its existence, justification, durability, and the like. Against this background, this paper attempts to underline the idea and journey of the LIO into two visions – thick and thin LIOs – and explain some of their features. As it intends to address the question of what creates a division of the order, the central argument claims that the essence of the order, liberal democracy, divides the order into ‘thick LIO’ and ‘thin LIO.’ Theoretically, the paper employs methodological pluralism to expand the scholarship beyond the conventional discourse dominated by realism and liberalism. As such, other IR theories like constructivism and the English School are incorporated to reflect the dynamics and broad picture of its idea and journey. In empirical terms, the paper reflects on the role of non-western powers in their interplay with the various dimensions of the order. Majority of the great powers, both western and non-western, do not abide by the rules and norms of the order in its entirety, which makes its fragility. Simultaneously, they endorse several norms, values, and institutions, making its resilience. There is no such single entity in international relations called the liberal international order but an idea drives the multifaceted structure of the order on two main versions. The thick-LIO is inherently western and deep in character while the thin-LIO is more global in scope with more flexibility. The thick-LIO is US-centric, infused with deep liberal principles, chase for universalization of liberalism, and consequently pursues disastrous foreign policies guided by the liberal impulse. The thin-LIO is UN-centric, liberally compromising, tolerant of political regimes, and thus relatively non-universalist. Looking from a broad vantage point, therefore, illuminates the trajectory of the LIO into two visions. This scholarly enterprise of looking at LIO in these two visions reveals some intellectual confusion on the issue of LIO’s existence and durability.