When the going gets tough, the EU has no choice between 'strategic autonomy' and the transatlantic alliance

The Western reactions to Russia’s assault on Ukraine in February 2022 were surprisingly united and tangible leading the paper to present a dual puzzle. First, despite the war was taking place on European soil, the United States took the lead in the attempts to fend of the war. In the period following the invasion, the US also played a crucial role gathering the unified resistance to the Russian behavior. Nevertheless, the European Union maintains it is a crucial foreign policy goal to show ‘strategic autonomy’ and, it could be argued that the exactly the Russian behavior calls for European action. However, the members of the EU could only agree on the diffuse goal of pursuing ‘strategic autonomy but, when it came to implementing the aim, the member states were unable to agree if, and in case, how to pursue strategic autonomy. The paper presents two arguments. First, the war and the lack of European strategic autonomy indicate that the first choice of the EU member states is the transatlantic alliance when the security situation becomes really serious, like it is in the wake of Russian assault on Ukraine. Therefore, European decision-makers were keen to show willingness to act together with the United States and support the priorities of Washington. It was particularly obvious in the confrontations with Russia. But, also in West Africa/the Sahel and in the Indo-Pacific, the Europeans tried to demonstrate solidarity with the US. The willingness to show support to the US is an indication of increasing European fears of being abandoned by Washington. In brief, the main obstacle to European integration within foreign and security policy was the lack of a common European strategic culture and thus the strength of 27 different national strategic cultures. The second argument states that maybe the biggest challenge to European integration within security and foreign policies is domestic developments in United States. As of early 2023, it is totally unclear if the fraction of the American foreign policy establishment that supports Joe Biden’s current priorities in Ukraine will remain in the stronger position. If the other fraction of the foreign policy establishment gains strength, the Indo-Pacific will receive most of the attention whereas Europe is left on its own. In brief, the situation of the European Union is totally dependent on the US.