Radicalization after Electoral Failure: Dynamics of Illiberal Populism

How do populist politicians respond to electoral losses? Can we observe any shift in their rhetoric after they switch from government to opposition or when they return to power? We address these questions in the context of two post-communist countries, where populist figures formerly occupied government positions during the last decade but have lost their grip on power as a result of electoral defeat. Our paper analyses Slovak populist party SMER–SD and Czech populist party ANO, focusing on discourse delivered by their respective party leaders, Róbert Fico (SMER–SD) and Andrej Babiš (ANO). While the phenomena of political radicalisation and the shift towards illiberalism which may occur as a result of electoral defeat has been observed in such cases as Viktor Orbán (Rupnik, 2012) or Donald Trump (Kydd, 2021), we still lack a coherent understanding of how and why exactly such development occurs. Based on our preliminary observations, we argue that populist politicians who have been part of the executive for several years may radicalize their rhetoric and even adopt certain illiberal tenets once they switch to the opposition as result of electoral loss. We also argue based on other cases such as Hungary, Poland and Turkey that they might even radicalize once returning to power so they can minimize their risk of losing power once more. Thus, we place Czech and Slovak populism within a wider global context. Additionally, compared to the situation in countries such as Hungary or Poland, where incumbent populists shifted towards illiberalism after successfully regaining power, the Czech and Slovak case demonstrates a rather different trend, with the two above-mentioned parties undergoing noticeable radicalization during their stay in opposition. Both Czechia and Slovakia can also be considered critical cases, as these two countries are generally perceived as being among the most liberal ones in the former Eastern Bloc. Scholars generally assume that government participation may have a moderating effect on populist movements in terms of their discourse. The ‘inclusion-moderation’ thesis postulates that populist parties tone down their rhetoric after they enter government, as a result of being forced to engage in day-to-day deliberation, make compromises with their coalition partners and deliver actual political outputs to their constituents (Akkerman, et al. 2016). Populists in power may thus abandon some of their radical positions due to their prolonged participation in democratic institutions. We argue, by contrast, that populist parties over time can become more radical after having power if they then lose it. Both in opposition and when returning to power, they are likely to become more radical and illiberal than during their original period of rule.