International fiscal rules and domestic support for austerity

In the last decade, growing fiscal integration among European countries has manifested through new restrictive fiscal rules. However, at the domestic level, high public debt and limited fiscal space often meet citizens’ resistance to the consolidation of public finances. International obligations have demonstrated their capacity to raise public support for costly domestic policies that are consistent with the obligations’ terms. Yet, whether the same logic applies to fiscal rules remains understudied. Can European fiscal pledges influence public opinion and boost support for consolidating public debt through austerity? To answer this question, I fielded an original survey experiment in Italy, where austerity is widely unpopular. I manipulated information about the existence of a new fiscal rule, national or European, mandating the implementation of austerity measures. In stark contrast with extant research, I find no evidence that the source of the fiscal rule matters when measuring respondents’ support for austerity. This result suggests that the effect of international pledges on garnering public support for costly domestic actions wanes if these actions directly burden citizens’ financial well-being. Moreover, relinquishing fiscal autonomy in favour of new EU-level rules appears unlikely to aid politicians in winning public endorsement for an austerity agenda.