Presidents and Elite-level Preference: A Comparative Analysis of Multiple Data Types in East Asia

Since directly elected presidents are highly salient and active members of the political elite, students of mass-elite congruence have tapped into both behavior data (e.g., sponsored executive bills, issued decrees, annual speeches, or legislation veto records) and attitudinal data (e.g., election manifestos or expert surveys) to derive their preferences. Based on four presidential democracies in East Asia—South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, and the Philippines—the first goal of the paper is to evaluate each data type in measuring presidents’ policy preferences vis-à-vis validity, continuity, and comprehensiveness. Furthermore, given that president and parliamentary elites are interdependent in producing national-level legislative outputs, e.g., presidents’ veto power can increase the legislative threshold from a majority to two-thirds of the legislature, the second goal of the paper lies in exploring ways to systematically merge elite-level preference as one. Specifically, the paper demonstrates that preference weight between the president and parliamentary elites should be guided by factors such as the president’s powers, analyzed policy area, or the period in question, e.g., honeymoon or lame-duck.