The Effect of Perceived Risks on Protest Networks, Mobilization and Protest Diffusion

What is the effect of state repression on protests? Research on the effects of state repression and perceived risks on protest political participation is not only scarce but also inconclusive (Aytaç, Schiumerini and Stokes 2018, Earl 2011; Honari 2018). Decades of research in sociology and political science have explored that sometimes repression is followed by a decrease in protests (deterrence effect) while in other cases repression stirs up protest activity. Empirical studies on the risk-participation nexus often find this surprising backfire effect of repression. Namely, police attacks on non-violent demonstrators incite large-scale protest waves. Macro-level studies on the effects of police violence also indicate that the risk of protest participation may increase participation levels in specific contexts (Khawaja 1993; Moss 2014; Steinert and Dworschak 2022, Chiang 2021). Due to this contradiction between rational intuition and empirical evidence, the risk–participation nexus has long been regarded as paradoxical (see e.g., Lichbach 1987). However, we know much less about the effects of state repression on the mobilization at the level of individuals. This study investigates how citizens react to the physical or non-physical harm of protest participation. How does repression affect the willingness to recruit others (asking to join the protest), and to participate in protest events? Our first analysis builds on online survey experiments conducted in May 2021 in Hungary. Respondents in the treatment group read a short text resembling a real news article about a protest against a company where the protesters were attacked by the company’s security guard. After the “news article” our respondents answered questions about their willingness to mobilize others and their own willingness to protest. The experiment reveals that receiving information about the physical risks of protest participation significantly decreases both the level of protest willingness and the level of mobilizing others. Beyond the survey experiment, we conducted a survey, in December 2022 among teachers taking part in a large-scale strike. Data was gathered right after the state started targeted soft repression against the most active protesters. In our survey, we asked about the respondents recruitment networks: by whom they were asked to take part in the strike and who they themselves invite to join. (We used the standard protest survey question battery – see Walgrave and Wouters 2014.) Also, we asked questions about the personal experience of repression, willingness to protest and willingness to recruit their colleagues. Preliminary results of our regression analysis show that those teachers who were threatened and experienced non-physical repression are significantly more willing to participate in strikes in the nearest future. However, they are also less willing to recruit others. Thus soft state repression has a backfire effect on protest activists, but also stifles recruitment efforts and hampers the diffusion of protest. These empirical outcomes can be used as input for agent-based simulations.