Informal Control Over Implementation in UN Peacekeeping

How do powerful states control policy implementation in international organizations (IOs)? The conventional principal-agent model focuses on formal and multilateral control mechanisms. By contrast, the informal governance literature posits that powerful states interfere unilaterally in IO work in high-stake situation. We argue that formal and multilateral control mechanisms are indeed insufficient for powerful member states to control IO policy implementation but that their interference is not limited only to high-stake situations. We propose the concept of graduated control over IO policy implementation. Dominants states in an IO have three mechanisms of informal control: joint forums, strategic appointments, and intermittent meddling, each with varying costs. Joint forums that involve officials from both member states and the IO are the costliest mechanism as they place significant demands on member state representatives’ time, weaken IO legitimacy, and lead to the diffusion of information. Strategic appointments, which entail placing citizens of one’s own or allied countries on IO staff are the medium-cost option as they take effort and diplomatic capital to pushthrough. The least costly option is intermittent meddling, which requires limited attention and investment from powerful member states as they ‘course correct’ IO implementation in crisis moments. Contrary to the informal governance literature, we argue that dominant states choose intermittent meddling in cases of weak interest in an IO programme, while medium interest translates into strategic appointments and strong interest requires the establishment of joint forums. We assess the plausibility of our argument using case studies of three UN peacekeeping operations – in Haiti, Liberia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – based on more than 150 interviews with former and current UN officials.