Compromise in Habermas and in the deliberative tradition of democratic theory

Jürgen Habermas is one of the most important contemporary representatives of the tradition of deliberative democratic theory. An initial analysis of his work (1996, 2000), including his interventions in political practice in the "Kleine politische Schriften" (Small Political Writings), shows that compromise plays a marginal role and is normatively characterized as a fundamentally deficient mode of political practice. If, on the other hand, we look at representatives of deliberative democratic theory in the Anglo-Saxon world, we find a positive appreciation of compromise. This is most evident in the work of Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996, 2004, 2012); a similar, though not as pronounced, tendency can be seen in James Bohman (1996, 2007). In addition, critics from the Anglo-Saxon world in particular accuse Habermas of a problematic marginalisation of compromise. On the basis of these initial findings, the paper addresses two tasks: In a first step, it systematically assesses the status assigned to compromise in the work of Jürgen Habermas and in the work of selected representatives of deliberative democratic theory in the Anglo-Saxon world. In a second step, it analyses which causes lead to a different appreciation of compromise. (At least) four factors come into question: (1) basic theoretical and theoretical-architectural decisions, (2) determinations of the fundamental circumstances of politics (e.g. the status and consequences of moral plurality), (3) judgements on the capabilities of compromises and (4) political-cultural traditions and historical experiences.