Can Government Policies Moderate Political Backlash to Economic Modernization?

A rapidly growing literature suggests that economic uncertainty created by structural transformation and technological change contributes to political dissatisfaction and the recent surge in populist voting. We address a natural but often overlooked follow-up question: can governments moderate political backlash to economic modernization through appropriate policy interventions? While existing work suggests that spending cuts and austerity are electorally harmful to governments, we know surprisingly little about the presence of the reverse mechanism. We theorize the conditions under which expansive government policies may increase political support among those affected by economic modernization and empirically zoom in on a carefully chosen and significant policy intervention: the French professional security contract (CSP), introduced with the explicit aim of supporting workers hit by structural economic change. Building on fine-grained register data from the French Public Employment Service, we examine whether the number of local CSP recipients mediates the relationship between structural economic change and municipal-level turnout and election outcomes. We complement the analysis with original surveys to study underlying mechanisms and test potential explanations of why a sizeable intervention does (not) moderate political responses.