Partial presidential vetoes and executive-legislative bargaining: Chile, 1990-2018

Defined as a credible threat that strengthens the bargaining position of the executive, presidential vetoes need not be zero-sum games in executive-legislative bargaining. Widely understudied, presidential vetoes carry a stigma of confrontation between state powers, but under some institutional setups, partial vetoes can be an additional step in the lawmaking process. We compiled a dataset with the 2346 bills introduced in Chile between 1990 and 2018 that reached a vetoable stage and identified 98 partial vetoes (4.2%) and only one total veto. We test 5 hypotheses to assess under what conditions presidents in Chile issue partial vetoes. Presidents are more likely to veto bills with more difficult legislative processes and when they have stronger support in at least one Chamber. As presidential vetoes in Chile are primarily partial and almost never total, they should be considered an additional step in executive-legislative bargaining in the lawmaking process.