The paper discusses Thomas Pogge’s and Allan Buchanan’s criticisms of Rawls’ Law of Peoples. Rawls argues for the exclusion of distributive justice from the global arena. Pogge and Buchanan attack Rawls starting from the premise that if there is a global basic structure, then there should be global distributive justice. The paper accepts the existence of a global basic structure, but argues that the Rawlsian argument is still tenable. Rawls argues that because the basic structure, made up by social and political institutions, deeply affects the lives of individuals, it must be considered the primary subject of justice. However, in the Law of Peoples, Rawls refuses to establish principles of distributive justice at the global level by arguing that no basic structure exists. He uses a two-step model of the original position to establish principles of justice at the global level. In Realizing Rawls, Pogge disapproves of Rawls not using a one-time global original position model in order to arrive at the global definition of justice. Pogge attacks the two-step model and defends a single global original position. Buchanan, in “Rawls’ Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian World”, accepts the two-step model, but argues that a global original position with peoples as represented parties would lead to more stringent demands of global distributive justice. The paper criticizes Pogge by showing how his argument fails to incorporate the possibility of reform at the national level. Even if one accepts the existence of a global basic structure which constrains the choices of poorer states, one can argue that if these states are internally just, they can overcome economic constraints. Regarding the arguments made by Buchanan, the paper shows that they are already comprised in Rawls’ principles. In a world which realizes Rawls’ demands, Buchanan’s stringencies are not needed.
