The Stabilitocracy Paradigm Reexamined: Domestic Allies of Europeanization and Are They to Be Found in Serbia?

The stabilitocracy paradigm featured prominently in the recent scholarly debates about the EU's relationship towards prospective member countries of the Western Balkans. It posits that the EU prefers stability over democracy promotion in this troubled region by disregarding democratic backsliding and providing an external support for strong–arm leaders (Bieber 2018; Cianetti & Hanley 2018; Ross Smith, Markovic Khaze & Kovacevic 2021). However, scholars have typically taken the paradigm for granted without evidence for a genuine support for such leaders. This work reexamines the paradigm by analyzing the recent trend of populist styles among parties in Serbia. It is argued that both the ruling SNS under its longtime leader Aleksandar Vučić and the mainstream opposition which boycotted the 2020 elections used a repertoire of populist styles, which included messages of ill intentions of the EU and international community towards Serbia, involved conspiracist mindset, and aimed at public already primed through years of nationalist propaganda. The widespread use of populist styles from both sides leaves the EU without domestic allies, which are essential for the Europeanisation process. Additionally, the EU had so far limited potential to induce reforms among the reluctant Europeanizers (Dimitrova &. Pridham 2014; Kubicek 2003). Serbia's domestic party constellation had in recent years slipped towards the illiberal type (Schimmelfennig 2005). The mainstream parties in office and opposition formally accept the goal of EU integration, but communicate reservations to the process and demonstrate practices conflicting with the Copenhagen democracy requirement. Opposition parties increasingly compete on Vučić's SNS terrain by promoting nationalistic themes. The problem of finding domestic allies might exist beyond the Serbian case, including Montenegro and Kosovo. To foster Europeanization and democratization the opposition should also embrace the EU integration in more than just form, along with democratic values, demonstrate genuine interest in democracy and accept reformist agenda. The stabilitocracy paradigm has a perilous delegitimizing effect on the EU integration. The EU is an exporter of democracy to prospective members, and unrefined criticism of its practices makes its values less appropriate (March & Olsen 1989), undermines EU's transformative power (Börzel & Risse 2009), and takes away its normative advantage over forces from outside of Europe. Thus, the stabilitocracy paradigm further reduces the potential to reverse the recent democratic backsliding syndrome (Bieber 2020). To deduce EU's preferences over authoritarianism more fairly compared to those suggested by the stabilitocracy paradigm we should critically examine both actors in power, and those who seek to replace them.