Realism and materialism as methods in political theory

An important and productive contribution to methodological debates in political theory has been made in recent years by critics of so-called ‘ethics-first’ approaches: rejecting the notion that political problems can be resolved through the identification and application of supposedly pre-political ethical ideals, such critics have styled themselves as realists, insisting that political theory must be more attentive to the real world of politics. Yet, as some realists have acknowledged, these debates have sometimes been somewhat parochial: confined within the limits of analytic philosophy, and focused especially on criticising the dominant Rawlsian and post-Rawlsian forms of Anglophone theory. There is an alternative or parallel tradition that has much in common with realism, namely materialism – by which I mean here the materialism of Marxism, or historical materialism. Like realists, materialists have been consistently critical of idealist and moralist theories and their narrow focus on justice, have insisted on the significance of historical context and the priority of conflict, and have argued that political thought must be guided by other social and historical forms of enquiry; an important thread within recent realist work has been a form of ideology critique; and occasional references are made in the realist literature to key materialists (see e.g. Raymond Geuss’s use of Lenin). Yet, despite all this, it is realism rather than materialism that has emerged as the primary form of critique of ethics-first theories. This paper seeks to bring realism and (historical) materialism into dialogue. It explores similarities between the two approaches and examines whether realism can aid materialism (especially by delineating and articulating a concept of a specifically political realm) and materialism can aid realism (especially by critically reflecting on philosophy’s access to the ‘real world’).