For many decades Turkey, a Muslim but pro-Western and secular state, was considered by many politicians and researchers to be a “model” or “inspiration” for other Muslim countries. In recent years, that “model” function was challenged by: (a) the political power struggle in Turkey between the old secular, pro-Western Kemalist state elite (military, judiciary) and the new Muslim elite, represented by the democratically elected pro-Islamic governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) of Prime Minister Erdogan; (b) The AKP government’s new and pro-active foreign policy, which stokes fear of a “turning away” of Turkey from the “West”. My paper analyzes the democratic rise and empowerment, the policies and the impact of the pro-Islamic/Islamist ruling parties Welfare Party (RP) and AKP. My main arguments are that (a) after the putsch of 1980, the Kemalist state elite itself strengthened the Islamic identity of Turkey to combat the disintegration of the country along political, societal and confessional conflicts – that ethno-national Islamization of state, politics and society contributed unintended to the democratic empowerment of Islamist parties. Furthermore I argue that (b) endogenous and exogenous political and socio-economical determinants on the one side contributed to the pro-democratic transformation and political rise of the AKP. But on the other side they also led unmeant to the AKP’s sole party regime, its populist politicization of Islam and its increasingly authoritarian posture in recent years.
