Joining or leaving the party? The impact of mandatory referendums on international organizations’ membership

Over the world, close to one third of the countries impose the holding of a mandatory referendums for all changes to the national Constitution. Most of these referendums are activated on international cooperation issues as for example when citizens are called to the ballot to decide upon adhering to international treaties. What is the impact of these mechanisms on international cooperation dynamics? A stream of literature considers that the provision of public goods should stay outside of the political arena and that international cooperation should be legitimized at the output level. Other scholars theoretically argue that direct democracy mechanisms should promote international cooperation as the preference of the median voter is more likely to support stable international cooperation agreements than do elected representatives. This paper contributes to this debate by analyzing the impact of mandatory referendums on the persistence of international cooperation. At the empirical level, international cooperation is operationalized by looking at states’ entry and exit of international organizations active in the provision of global public goods. Building on Putnam’s two-level game approach, this paper argues that mandatory referendums increase the stability of international agreements while increasing their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens. The paper’s findings have strong normative implications at a time where the activities of international organizations are increasingly challenged.