Among de facto states, Abkhazia is unique in the sense that although proclaimed in the name of ethnic self-determination, the titular nation makes up less than half the total population. In the 1989 census ethnic Abkhaz did not comprise more than 17 per cent, while the Georgians with 45 per cent represented the single largest ethnic group. Even so, the Abkhaz to a large extent managed to dominate political life in the then autonomous republic. As a de facto state, Abkhazia has developed a remarkably democratic political system, with a high degree of media freedom, civil society pluralism, and contested elections. Political life is, however, completely dominated by ethnic Abkhaz. During the war of secession in 1992/93 most of the Georgians fled, and in the new demographic situation the Abkhaz and the Armenian group, according to many outside observers (Trier et al 2010) are roughly of equal size. In spite of the fact that the Armenians fought on the Abkhaz side during the war, and currently are economically influential, they are marginalized in Abkhazian politics. Why do they not demand greater influence? In this paper we will discuss four possible explanatory frameworks to account for this: ethnocracy (Lustick 1979; Butenschøn 1993); ethnic democracy (Smooha 1990, Caspersen 2011); business as a safety vault (Commercio 2010), and ‘Sons of the soil’-mechanisms (Milne 1981; Kolstø et al. 1999).
