How costs of electoral manipulation affect choosing from the “menu of electoral manipulation”

Are incumbents in electoral authoritarian regimes choosing between different forms of electoral manipulation based on their direct and indirect costs? Despite the vast research agenda on this topic, no global cross-national analyses with newer cases are available. While using a dataset that includes 340 elections in 68 electoral authoritarian regimes from 1980 to 2020, this study aims to fill this gap and explore how incumbents decide between different tactics of electoral manipulation. Results reveal that direct and indirect costs rarely affect choosing between different types of electoral manipulation. Instead, the study finds that incumbents are likely to deploy most or all types of electoral manipulation at once if they have the opportunity. Moreover, contrary to the theoretical expectations, the more uncertain the electoral outcome is, the less electoral manipulation is employed. The study contributes to the understanding of electoral authoritarian regimes by debunking the myth prevalent in the literature.