War and related forms of conflict have substantially changed in recent years and challenge traditional normative conceptions of collective violence. Disregarding substantial changes in the empirical phenomena, philosophers still tend to treat moral questions related to war and collective violence according to the standards of the 2000 year-old idea of Just War Theory (JWT). JWT provides a well-founded framework for moral reasoning about the justifiability of war and war-like violence. However, it cannot without further adjustment be applied to contemporary cases. Meaningful development needs to take contemporary forms of violence into greater account that do not fit in the classical model of interstate war. This paper aims at proposing an advanced approach of JWT by taking a closer look at the notion of violence. As the traditional concept of war falls short of capturing increasingly diffuse forms of conflict appropriately, violence as a more comprehensive notion is used instead to describe and compare them. Scrutinizing philosophical approaches to define violence, the paper presents an explication of violence based on the violation of fundamental rights of persons. Thus, JWT can be reformulated and broadened as “Just Violence Theory” (JVT) reflecting the changing nature of war-related phenomena. The reconceptualization of JWT towards JVT enables moral judgments and systematic comparison of different forms of violence that is to a great extent independent of actors and contexts. At the same time, JVT attaches value to the individuals suffering from violence. Shifting the focus from war to violence, this paper contributes to the development of a theoretical model for moral reasoning about contemporary forms of conflict.
