I’m a Survivor: Political Dynamics in Bureaucratic Elites’ Partisanship

A change in the party in power represents a major shift in the political environment of public bureaucracies. Building on principal-agent and organization theory, we hypothesize that bureaucratic elites may respond to such political turnover by adjusting their (self-reported) partisan leaning towards that of their elected principals. We test this prediction using data from the American State Administrators Project (ASAP) over the 1964-2008 period, which allows studying the same US agency leaders (N=951 individuals) before and after partisan shifts in their agency’s elected principals. We find significant evidence that agency leaders reorient their partisan leaning in response to shifts in the party in power. Such adjustments are stronger for agency leaders directly appointed by, or having more frequent contacts with, their elected principals as well as those more heavily involved in policy development rather than internal management. These results suggest a malleability of partisanship seldom attributed to bureaucratic elites.