The role of surrogate inspectorates in regulatory networks: a theoretical framework.

Nowadays, a manifold of non-state actors is involved in the regulatory domain; consequently, regulation is thus increasingly performed with and by third parties. The current literature, for instance, identifies private, self-, and civil society regulators (Van Erp, 2019). In this paper, we identify a new type of third party in the regulatory regime: surrogate inspectorates. Surrogate inspectorates have no regulatory power, but try to ‘encourage’ formal regulators to act in many different ways. For example, consumer programs on TV that signal bad practices and accuse regulators of inactivity can be considered surrogates. In addition, we identify labor unions who go to court to force regulators to enforce existing regulations as surrogate inspectorates. In the second part of the proposed paper, we analyze how these surrogate inspectorates change the governance dynamics in regulatory networks which are, as we argue, increasingly characterized by horizontal, diverse, and decentered regulatory networks (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Van Erp, 2019). This changing institutional landscape asks for a network-oriented way of looking at the regulatory domain, where results of regulatory efforts are dependent on the interaction of several actors rather than the actions of one single regulator (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016). This paper aims, using existing insights from (surrogate) regulation theory, but also connecting this to collaborative and network theory, to contribute to the theory of surrogate regulators and their role in the regulation network. We then apply this theoretical framework to several regulative cases, showing dynamics between actors and how they affect the regulative process. We compare the cases and dynamics and discuss the importance of surrogate inspectorates.