The legitimacy of regulatory agencies: Expertise-based or reputation-sourced?

The article examines how expertise-based authority (EBA) and reputation-sourced authority (RSA) – individually and jointly – shape citizens’ perceptions of regulatory agency legitimacy. Both types of authority are argued to be important legitimation sources for regulatory agencies operating independently from political institutions. However, the relationship between the two diverse sources of authority and legitimacy is undertheorized and has not been subjected to rigorous empirical scrutiny. The article introduces novel hypotheses that combine insights from political science, public administration, and psychology. First, we argue that both the EBA and RSA foundations increase the legitimacy of agency rulemaking, however, drawing on bureaucratic reputation theory, we expect the effects of RSA on perceived legitimacy to be larger. Second, we make a theoretical contribution by introducing a negativity bias argument to theorize about the asymmetric effects of positive and adverse bureaucratic reputation on perceived legitimacy. Third, we further theorize how and why EBA can enhance the positive effects of a strong reputation and abate the negative effects of an adverse reputation on perceived legitimacy. We draw on a pre-registered survey experiment with a population-based sample of 1606 Dutch citizens to study their legitimacy perceptions about the European Food Safety Authority. Employing a between-subjects survey experiment with a 2x3 factorial design, participants were randomly assigned to vignettes that differ in terms of the scientific-basis of rulemaking (EBA absent/EBA present) and bureaucratic reputation (RSA absent/ positive RSA/negative RSA). We find that the presence of EBA increases the perceived legitimacy of rulemaking, whereas possessing an adverse reputation carries negative legitimacy implications. We do not, however, find support that holding a positive reputation enhances the legitimacy of rulemaking. We, further, find that the presence of EBA reduces the negative effects of adverse reputation and strengthens the positive effects of positive RSA on the perceived legitimacy of regulatory agencies.