Democratic transition, consolidation and breakdown have been the focus of much research for a while. Following the wave of new institutionalism, the institutional design has been thought as key element in the fate of democratic transition and democratic system. The role of some institutions in these processes has been investigated, e.g. the effect of system type was (Cheibub 2006). Nevertheless, the role of constitutional courts has been neglected in the comparative analysis of this process. More research is necessary about the roles played by Courts in the democratization process as well as the democratic break-down. Most of the recently democratized country introduced a constitutional court either as defense to democracy or as insurance policy of the old elites against the new ones (Ginsburg 2006). On the other hand little is known about the ability of constitutional courts to prevent breakdown and Kelsen (1929) even argues that courts are not able to prevent the move from democracy to authoritarian regimes. The paper will systematically analyze the transition processes along the lines of Cheibub by introducing the court as a new variable. We will give a systematic comparative overview about transitions process from and to democracy with or without constitutional courts and quantitatively analyze of the Courts’ impact on the process of establishing and maintaining democracy.
