Fluid Borders, Solid Skepticism? Examining the role of internal-external bordering dynamics in explaining Euroscepticism

In the past two decades, the European Union has faced a series of crises, a so-called `polycrisis’ that has shaken the EU to its core (Zeitlin et al 2019). This polycrisis has instigated Euroskeptic sentiments among European voters, thereby contributing to an augmented salience of the EU. A shared factor unifying all these crises is that they all originated outside the EU. Lacking adequate national competence to deal with their implications, this predicament underscores the inherent challenge member states face due to internal openness without a commensurate external demarcation and delineation (Schimmelfennig, 2021). Against this background, the current study seeks to examine if the challenges emanating from internal openness without sufficient external demarcation represent a significant ‘antecedent’ of EU scepticism – an aspect rarely studied in the literature on public Euroscepticism (Hobolt and de Vries 2016). Specifically, it seeks to examine whether fortifying the EU's external borders could potentially reinvigorate and bolster public support for internal openness among the European electorate. The analysis places particular emphasis on radical-right Eurosceptic voters and focuses specifically on immigration as a rigorous litmus test for radical-right Euroscepticism. Several EU policies will be employed to capture the external-bordering dimension, such enlarging the EU’s border costal guard (Frontex) to 10,000 border guards by 2024, the European Migration and Asylum Pact, and the Return Directive, whereas the free movement of persons within the EU will capture the internal dimension. Methodologically, this paper will employ a population-based survey experiment in a selection of EU member states to empirically investigate this question.