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Military Coups and Post-Coup Electoral Outcomes. A Global Assessment Since the End of the Cold War

Africa
Comparative Politics
Democracy
Qualitative Comparative Analysis
Sebastian Elischer
University of Florida
Sebastian Elischer
University of Florida

Abstract

Inspired by the ongoing debate about the effect of coups on subsequent regime trajectories, the article examines the conduct of praetorian armies in electoral contests that have occurred in the aftermath of military coups since the end of the Cold War. It distinguishes between two post-coup trajectories: First is the organization of post-coup elections without junta participation or interference and the subsequent extrication of the junta from executive power. This scenario is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratization. Second is the manipulation of post-coup elections in favor of its preferred candidate or party. This scenario leads to praetorian-led electoral authoritarianism and the entrenchment of the junta in executive power. Drawing on the logic of fuzzy-set theoretic models, the article assesses the overlap between both post-coup outcomes and several explanatory conditions such as the immediate coup triggers, the involvement of citizens in civil society organizations, membership in international organizations with an anti-coup norm, the historical role of the armed forces aid dependency on democracy promoters, and trade linkages with Western democracies. Both outcome conditions show a high degree of overlap with the conditions that triggered the coup in question. Coups ushering in the juntas’ extrication further display a high involvement of citizens in civil society organizations. Coups leading to praetorian-led electoral authoritarianism display a lack of donor leverage and the lack of membership in international organization with an anti-coup norm. The paper examines two case studies from West Africa - Guinea and Mauritania - in greater detail to illustrate its findings. The second part of the paper will compare the long-term implications of both outcomes. It finds that post-coup electoral contests that lead to praetorian-led electoral authoritarianism to be remarkable durable over time. This part will identify the factors that enable praetorian militaries to consolidate their power over time.