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A New Dataset for the Study of Elite Defections in Electoral Autocracies

Comparative Politics
Democratisation
Elections
Government
Institutions
Parliaments
Political Parties
Coalition
Adrián del Río
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Adrián del Río
WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Abstract

While elite unity is the central pillar of authoritarian regime stability, the defection of ruling elites often threatens authoritarian rule. Many theories associate elite defections with sources of regime vulnerability, opposition dynamics, and democratization. Yet, beyond case studies and small-n analysis, there has been a shortfall of empirical work due to the lack of comparable cross-country data. To remedy this gap, this study introduces a new dataset of defection in electoral autocracies based on fine-grained information on the political careers of 35,029 deputies and ministers in 23 electoral autocracies. This study is a chapter of my book manuscript project entitled “Turncoat Politics. The Origins and effects of Elite Defections in Autocracies.” The new dataset includes several variables measuring how ruling elites defect, such as the frequency, timing, exit choice, and events surrounding an individual’s defection. The dataset allows aggregating the data at the country, party, and individual levels and merging it with existing datasets in the literature on authoritarianism and democratization. In addition to describing the dataset’s content, the chapter details the data collection efforts and the validity and reliability of key variables. Afterward, I descriptive important cross-national patterns over the regime duration, which lead to the generation of hypotheses that can serve as building blocks for explanatory theory. Finally, I illustrate how the dataset can address key questions, such as the relationship between economic growth and regime change via defections; or the relationship between (regime and opposition) party characteristics and defections. The findings suggest new research avenues in the field of authoritarianism and democratization. Moreover, in looking at defections across electoral autocracies, this article aims to exploit variation across this type of regime and advance research that more directly connects competing theories of authoritarian politics with legislators’ and ministers’ behavior.