The role of courts in susta

Authoritarian leaders worry about elections and can use constitutional courts to side-line the opposition, legitimize unfair electoral rules, or limit freedoms of political expression. At the same time, autocrats are also concerned with the legitimacy of the electoral process: elections that are not considered legitimate by the public could cause mass protests. What is the role of constitutional courts in these processes? I argue that timing is vital. Electoral disputes require timely adjudication, often within weeks, if not days, of the submission. However, the nature of constitutional proceedings does not allow for such speed. Consequentially, rulings in favour of a petitioner do not impinge upon the distribution of power: the elections have already passed and, even if a specific requirement is found unconstitutional, the regime has time to control the electoral field before the next electoral round. I focus on Russia, an authoritarian regime with constantly changing electoral legislation, and the role of the Russian Constitutional Court in upholding or nullifying these changes. Using an original dataset on the court’s judgments between 1992 and 2021 (N = 734), I find that the RCC is, in fact, more likely to nullify electoral laws. I complement these findings with in-depth study of all electoral disputes decided by the RCC in connection to the changes in electoral laws.