Re-fashioned Socio-Cultural Frames: The Populist Radical Right and Russian Influence in Post-Soviet EU Spaces

Introduction This project asks, ‘How do Populist Radical Right Parties in Post-Soviet EU spaces (PRRPps) frame traditional socio-cultural policies, and to what extent have these frames been modified or abandoned in response to proximate geo-political shocks?’ The rise of the Populist Radical Right in post-soviet spaces (PRRPps) has attracted substantial scholarly attention. Despite this, the literature has failed to explore the possibility of alignment between the cultural and geo-political components of populism. This is surprising given that the geo-political, historical, and cultural pressures of soviet subjugation can be expected to complicate PRRPps’ modus operandi of preserving their nations “traditional” heritage and identity, especially in the face of explicit, and proximate, Russian aggression. Focusing specifically on the socio-cultural spheres vocalised commitment to promoting a particular conception of native identity, I investigate whether this pledge, and the framing devices which are used to anchor and legitimise it, are able to withstand proximate geo-political shocks. Case Selection Interested in analysing whether differing configurations of (tactical) loyalty towards Russia influence frame durability, I focus on the pragmatism of Fidesz; the passionately anti-Russian position upheld by PiS; and finally, the flexible opportunism demonstrated by EKRE, particularly in regard to the Russian-speaking minority who predominantly reside in the Eastern (border) city of Narva. Developing this theme of historical and geo-political pressures, I examine how nostalgia, native othering practices, and securitised fear, operate as framing devices which are strategically deployed to preserve a nations’ socio-cultural heritage. This is conducted within the confined categories of: Demographics; Language, Education, and Engagement with Diasporas; and Sport, Leisure, and the Arts. While these policy domains are overarching, the specific policy promises I assess are determined on a case-by-case basis, reflecting each nations individual policy agenda. Methods I adhere to the principle that ‘it is fanciful to imagine that populism can only be measured as a set of words to be counted’ (Moffit and Tormey, 2015:386). Accordingly, I study both the discursive and performative components of populism and implement a multimodal methodology. Applying gentle modifications to the analytical frameworks outlined by Rose (2023) and Fairclough (1995) my dataset incorporates images, videos, campaign posters and other visual manifestations of PRRPPS discourse, alongside written documents such as press statements, manifestoes and other publicly broadcast material. Findings The most notable finding is that, in addition to their conventional audiences, PRRPps’ are directly communicating with (and utilising the identity category of) diasporic communities in order to frame conceptions of nationhood which transcend territorial parameters. For example, following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, EKRE moved from a framing strategy which accentuated securitised fear based on territorial fragility, towards an alternative strategy which adjusted the boundaries of native belonging to incorporate the Russian-speaking minority. This practice is also adopted by Fidesz, whose citing of the Treaty of Trianon to provoke feeling of loss and separation from ones homeland, is deliberately targeted towards the Hungarian minority in Transcarpia, and alongside native differentials such as “ethnic Hungarians,” is particularly inflamed surrounding the Hungarian-language education dispute.