This paper proposes a systematic, two-step analysis of how electoral systems affect the representational role and behavior of legislators using data from the comparative legislators’ survey recently conducted in over seventy national and regional parliaments in fifteen European democracies under the PARTIREP Research Project. In the first step, we will test the impact of different electoral system characteristics (i.e. ballot structure, district magnitude, and electoral formula) upon the incentives to cultivate a personal vote as legislators perceive them. In line with Zittel and Gschwend’s (2008) notion of ‘campaign norms’, legislators were asked to assess the relative utility of personal compared to party campaigns in attaining re-election. In the second step, the paper will use this arguably more direct measurement of personal vote-seeking incentives as a mediator variable to explain the impact formal electoral rules have on two often-cited indicators of personal and partisan vote-seeking: legislators’ commitment to constituency service and to upholding party discipline.
