In the Eye of the Beholder: Explaining Divergent Suspension Behavior of Overlapping Regional International Organizations

Between 1990 and 2022, there have been 96 instances of suspensions of member states by regional international organizations (RIOs). Suspensions are temporal revocations of some or all of the procedural rights that a state enjoys through its membership in a RIO by the organization’s executive branch and are issued primarily as reactions to unconstitutional changes of government, massive human rights violations, and external aggression. Under the condition of regional regime complexity, most states are members of several RIOs, which overlap in terms of member states and policy competencies. While states can be suspended by more than one RIO, the sanctioning behavior of overlapping RIOs often varies. Thus, this paper addresses the following research question: Why does the suspension behavior of overlapping RIOs differ concerning the extent of divergence? First, the paper illustrates puzzling divergences in the suspension behavior of overlapping RIOs concerning shared member states. Overlapping RIOs often diverge in their decision to (not) suspend a shared member state as states are rarely suspended by all RIOs they are a member of. This was evident in the 2022 suspension of Russia by the Council of Europe but not by the OSCE. Similarly, most RIOs do not suspend all of their member states which face simultaneous suspensions by other organizations. Additionally, RIOs that do not suspend a shared member state can either reinforce, obstruct, or ignore the suspending RIO’s efforts by condemning the target state and issuing additional sanctions against it, expressing its solidarity with the target state and condemning its suspension, or not reacting to the situation at all. The paper conceptualizes the suspension behavior of overlapping RIOs on a continuum of varying divergence. Second, to answer the research question, the paper draws on research on institutional design, regime complexity, overlapping regionalism, and inter-organizational relations, to identify several factors influencing differences in RIOs’ capacity and willingness to suspend a member state and reinforce each other’s efforts. Finally, subjecting the hypotheses to an empirical plausibility probe based on a series of comparative qualitative case studies, the paper provides three insights. First, the varying extent of divergence in the suspension behavior of overlapping RIOs does not primarily result from differences concerning the relative power of the target state, the existence and design of suspension clauses, or the RIOs’ institutionalization of the violated norm. Instead, second, the most relevant factor explaining the extent of divergence in RIOs’ suspension behavior is differences in the relationship between the target state and the respective RIOs. Third, the extent of divergence between RIOs increases with the number of factors present. In this regard, structural conflicts between overlapping RIOs’ exclusive members, as well as the absence of principles regulating the relationship between RIOs, increase the divergence in their suspension behavior. The paper’s findings thereby contribute to our understanding of multilateral sanctions, the resilience of international organizations in the face of norm violations and transgressive member states, as well as the factors contributing to inter-organizational cooperation and conflict in a dense international institutional environment.