The proposed paper “Europe and the 2010 IMF Governance Reform” in particular attempts to explain the conclusion of the 2010 governance reform despite previous diverging positions of the core actors as the dependent variable. An analytical framework will be introduced in which two explanatory variables are of importance: “societal ideas” and “bargaining power”. The domestic shaped variable „societal ideas“ focuses on how the position of the respective state in the international community should be. This variable provides an explanation for the diverging preferences concerning IMF governance structures. The variable „bargaining power“ is related to the position of the states in the reform negotiations and explains why in some cases the diverging positions can be overcome. In order to explain the reform outcomes, diminishing the institutional influence of the European member countries and the increasing of the institutional power of several emerging powers, the paper analyzes the preferences and bargaining power of the four most important countries in the reform negotiation process, Germany, the USA, China and Brazil. This analysis will provide evidence that reform steps were concluded where the reform proponents were vested with significant bargaining power and asked for moderate concessions. In contrast, the reform opponents possessed in these cases significant less bargaining power. The bargaining power is derived especially from the weak economic position of the industrial countries during the course of the financial crisis in comparison with the strong position of the emerging powers.
