Expect the best, prepare for the worst? Institutional anticipation for EU Council Presidencies

Research has extensively established that the Presidency of the Council of the EU, which rotates each six months among member states, can significantly influence this institution’s activity, as well as Commission’s introduction of legislative proposals. However, there is a research gap as for whether, how and why the Council anticipates and prepares for the different national executives assuming the role. Anticipation is a key feature of rational political behaviour, and thus, this paper explores it as for the case of the Hungarian Presidency (second semester of 2024) and RoL enforcement. Consensus-breach triggers anticipation: if a national government proves overly confrontational on a particular issue, those actors for whom the matter is a priority would strategically leverage available resources when foreseeing the presidency of the non-compliant government. This proactive stance aims to prevent the potential exclusion or blockage of the topic for the entire six-month Presidency term. Strategies for anticipation encompass the utilization of trio arrangements, exploitation of agenda-shaping mechanisms, and strategic issue-linkage. Empirically, the paper relies on qualitative content analysis of elite interviews with key actors.