Arguments

There are various methods of political philosophy but one which gets less attention is simply that of good arguments. This paper considers what the criteria for good arguments are, and looks at different forms of inference, and the contexts and justifications of their use. It examines the importance of assumptions, and how arguments give reasons, and reasons provide justifications. Scientific endeavour sometimes brings about radical belief change about the world. This is less likely in normative argument, though de-familiarization can provide radical normative belief change. The chapter examines how we generalize from specific arguments and construct moral terms and political institutions. It argues that when critiquing others’ accounts, we need to be aware of what their concepts and arguments were designed for within specific arguments. Too often, concepts and arguments are later used for new tasks for which they are not fitted. The chapter ends by considering the nature and limits of ‘reasonable rejection’ and ‘public reason’ as a form of political argument.