When local governments win (and when they lose): Conditions for successful intergovernmental lobbying in Germany

When do federal governments listen to local governments? In the absence of constitutional rights to co-legislate at higher levels of government, local governments in federal systems typically form local government associations (LGAs) in order to represent common local interests and to lobby state and federal governments. Yet, little is known when and why LGAs can successfully shape federal decision-making in line with their preferences. The present paper addresses this research gap and examines the lobbying success of LGAs in Germany with regard to 87 bills adopted in the German Bundestag during the 19th legislative period (2017–2021). Building on resource exchange theory, it argues that intergovernmental lobbying success can be explained by interest group and issue characteristics. Multilevel regression analysis of a novel dataset on 554 legislative requests reveals that LGAs are more likely to attain their preferences if a) they engage in a formal lobbying coalition of LGAs that signals unity among local governments, b) they submit a larger amount of policy-related technical information c) their legislative requests are supported by the Federal Council and d) their legislative requests do not directly affect the federal government’s budget. By contrast, public saliency, bill complexity and the degree of conflict show no significant effects on intergovernmental lobbying success. The findings have implications for the interest group literature and contribute to our understanding of territorial interest representation in federal democracies.