Technocratic Cabinets and Electoral Accountability

In order for government parties to remain responsive to public opinion, they should be held to account by voters. Yet, how electoral accountability functions when government cabinets consist of technocrats remains poorly understood. We investigate which political parties voters hold accountable when cabinet ministers, or even the prime minister, are technocrats without party affiliation. The increasing number of technocratic prime ministers and cabinet ministers in advanced democracies makes it important to better understand how voters behave under technocratic cabinets. We argue that a higher share of technocratic cabinet ministers increases voters' attribution of accountability to the prime minister's party, but that electoral accountability is weakened when the prime minister is a technocrat. Moreover, we assert that voters will rely on parliamentary seat shares and previous government participation as heuristics to assign responsibility to supporting political parties when a cabinet is fully technocratic. Combining Comparative Study of Electoral Systems data with data on the political affiliation and professional background of cabinet ministers and prime ministers in Europe between 2000 and 2020, we analyze the consequences of technocratic cabinets for electoral accountability. The findings will have important implications for our understanding of electoral accountability and the consequences of technocratic governance for voting behaviour.