A Dual Executive in Ethnically Divided Democracies: How Presidential Power, Cohabitation, and a Divided Executive Affect Rebellion

While all semi-presidential systems have a dual executive, the strengths of the president and premier are different. The key factors are whether the president can unilaterally dismiss the premier, whether they are from different parties, and whether the president’s party is presented in the cabinet. These factors determine whether there is a dual executive and whether it is strong, weak, or unbalanced. Do all semi-presidential systems with a dual executive perform similarly and outperform those with a de-facto single executive in mitigating ethnic rebellion? Through a large-N study on all the semi-presidential democracies, this paper expects that systems with a dual strong executive better reduce ethnic rebellion than those without this condition. In addition, this paper also anticipates finding that during cohabitation, greater presidential power is more conducive to mitigating ethnic conflicts. In the case of a divided executive, an optimal balance of presidential power, neither too large nor too small, is more favorable for easing ethnic tensions. In a unified government, the level of presidential power, however, does not affect ethnic conflicts.