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Reality-oriented New Peace Theory from Kantian Ethics in World Consciousness

Civil Society
International Relations
Constructivism
Ethics
Normative Theory
Jianxing Bai
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Jianxing Bai
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

Abstract

Kant's theory of perpetual peace has in the past been regarded as a purely idealized utopian setting, and does not have the corresponding practical significance and possibility of political practice. As an attempt to combine normative ethics and practical political philosophy, the two concepts of ethics are not completely compatible as far as the internal understanding of Kantian ethics is concerned, and an understanding of Kant according to the latter conception of ethics would lead to the criticism of Kant by the widely accepted political sciences. Kant, then, may have based his argumentation from the very beginning on a supersensible substratum, seeking to establish a normative thinking based on pure reason, not only for the life of the individual but also for the common life of individuals. In contrast to others, Kant's normative thinking is characterized first and foremost by the fact that the exploration of the relationship between right and morality is not centered on the possibility of transforming moral concepts into empirical law, but rather on value judgments and the criteria of evaluation that should be demanded, which makes not only the ethical but also the ethical essentially relevant in Kant's political practice. If we delve into a specific analysis of peace under Kant's philosophy of law, we can also go deeper and see that Kant demonstrates the same different relationship between the moral and ethical nature of the law's peace in the relationship between juridical power and virtue in the family, society, and the state. Here, our mere pointing out that this distinction exists is enough to demonstrate that past political science criticisms of Kant's peace theory are in need of further reflection.