Loyalty, Productivity and Service: Legislative Candidate Selection in Ghana

In Ghana’s First-Past-the-Post electoral system, several safe seats abound, heightening the relevance of internal party candidate selection processes. Since re-selection is invariably re-election in many constituencies, actual competition for parliamentary seats happen within instead of between parties. Yet despite the pivotal role party elites play in selecting legislators, we know only little, both theoretically and empirically, on their preferences and the exact aspects of MPs’ work they reward. Again, explanations that underpin their preferences remain a black box in Africa’s emerging democracies. Drawing on interviews with MPs and survey with local party delegates in Ghana, the paper argues that party elites in Ghana prefer candidates who deliver targeted patronage, demonstrate productivity in the parliamentary arena and deliver service to constituents. However, there are variations along the dimensions of constituency-specific electoral vulnerability and the party’s status in government. Success in candidate selection within political parties in power is hinged on party loyalty, demonstrable by the provision of targeted patronage to core party elites at the grassroots. Conversely, owing to resource constraints, elites in opposition parties return MPs who rather demonstrate legislative productivity. In electorally marginal constituencies, however, internal party selection focuses on active constituency service beyond elite loyalty regardless.