Political crises and presidential involvement: How do presidents in semi-presidential regimes use their powers in times of crisis?

Presidents and their constitutional powers are at the heart of academic debates on different political regimes and their distinctive specificities (Koker 2017). The field of semi-presidential studies has accumulated a wealth of analyses on intra-executive relations, democratic survival, presidential powers, etc. (Sedelius 2020). This paper aims to explore presidential involvement during political crises in semi-presidential regimes. Assuming that, presidential activism tends to be higher when the country is experiencing political turbulence, with a low level of societal consensus or weak governments (Tavits 2008; Raunio and Sedelius 2019) this paper raises the question of how do presidents in semi-presidential regimes use their powers in times of crisis? Taking into account the constellation of political powers and intra-executive relations, we assume that presidents have different incentives and seek different outputs depending on their relations with the prime minister and the majority in parliament on the one hand, and the degree of crisis on the other. Building on the Bulgarian experience, we propose a typology of presidential involvement during a crisis that considers the different outcomes a president might pursue depending on intra-executive relations, constellation of partisan forces, and the degree of the given crises. We offer several hypotheses: (1) The president seeks to deepen the crisis rather than resolve it during cohabitation. (2) Presidents tend to stay passive during crises if they are from the same party as the Prime Minister. (3) If the amplitude of the crisis is extreme, the President tends to be more active than the Prime Minister.