Over the last couple of years many states that have undergone a transition to democracy have also introduced mechanisms to deal with past human rights violations. These efforts are generally aided by international efforts and transnational advocacy networks that try to mobilize international institutions and the donor community to bring pressure on states to introduce some mechanisms of transitional justice. In the transnational advocacy literature, these efforts are usually treated as a suitable means to improve a state’s compliance with human rights standards. At the same time, a competing literature has emerged that views these efforts more critically. This literature argues that legal prosecutions or the threat of prosecution obstruct the more urgent task of peace building for two reasons: First, legal prosecution deters spoiler groups from ending military operations thus delaying peace agreements; second, they presuppose what can only be an outcome of peace-building efforts: strong legal institutions. Thus, peace building needs to come first, and if necessary at the expense of prosecutions. This paper tests both propositions in a comparative case study (East Timor, Indonesia, Sierra Leone) that looks specifically at the interplay between international pressures and domestic politics.
